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Introduction 
An individual country’s decision to adopt a particular exchange rate arrangement 
depends on many considerations. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods System 
of fixed exchange rates in 1973, most developing countries continued to peg the value 
of their currency to the currency of their main trading partner. Since then, most of them 
have moved towards greater flexibility, particularly in the form of managed exchange 
rates. According to the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, the number of 
developing countries with a pegged exchange rate decreased from 81 per cent in 1976 to 
43 per cent in 1998. Exchange rate flexibility is often now adopted in a world economy 
undergoing increasing international integration and, in some respects, increased 
instability. Despite this trend, the economies of the CFA zone have continued to 
maintain the pegged exchange rate regime first adopted in 1948, with a single 
devaluation in 1994. 
The CFA zone comprises 14 sub-Saharan African countries, of which 12 are former 
French colonies. Formally, they are divided into two currency unions, each with a single 
currency (both of which have the same acronym, CFA franc) issued by two regional 
central banks, one in Dakar (Senegal) and one in Yaounde (Cameroon). The two 
currencies are pegged to the French franc and thus now to the Euro. The CFA zone is 
unique in the world as a monetary union with a fixed exchange rate to the anchor 
currency country, France, guaranteeing convertibility of the CFA Franc with the Euro. 
France participates in the executive boards of the two regional central banks, and 
provides extensive financial and technical assistance to the member countries of the 
zone. 
After more than 40 years of stability, the 50 per cent devaluation of the CFA franc in 
January 1994, as well as factors such as the formation of the European Monetary Union, 
affect the performance of the CFA zone. Moreover, the member countries are 
confronted with a series of external disturbances including changes in international 
interest rates, adverse terms of trade movements and the debt crisis. In view of this 
situation, one might wonder whether the CFA countries should abandon the current 
pegged exchange rate arrangement and adopt a more flexible regime. The trade-off 
between fixed and flexible exchange rates depends on both external factors and internal 
ones (for example, domestic inflationary pressures resulting from budget deficits and 
leading to an overvalued domestic currency).  
There is an extensive theoretical literature on the optimum choice of an exchange rate 
regime. The first approach is based on the theory of the optimal currency areas, and 
focuses on a country’s structural characteristics. Mundell (1961) focused on the optimal 
exchange rate regime to maintain external balance, while McKinnon (1963) emphasized 
maintenance of price stability. The main conclusions of that literature are that a small 
open economy is better served by a fixed exchange rate. However, the more diversified 
is a country’s production and export structure and the less geographically concentrated 
its trade, the stronger is the case for the flexible exchange rate regime. This arrangement 
is also attractive when there is relatively low factor mobility, higher divergence of 
domestic inflation from that of the main trading partner and a higher level of economic 
and financial development.  
The second approach examines the optimal choice of an exchange regime in a world 
subject to different types of shocks. The basic conclusion of these studies is that the   2
optimal choice of an exchange regime depends on the nature and size of these shocks as 
well as the structure of the economy (see for example Fisher 1977, Turnovsky 1976, 
Flood 1979, Frenkel and Aizenman 1982). If the disturbances are real shocks, such as a 
shift in the demand for domestic goods, or even foreign nominal shocks, a greater 
degree of flexibility is preferable. But when the country experiences domestic nominal 
shocks, exchange rate adjustment is not necessary. 
A third approach emphasizes the role of credibility and political factors in the process of 
selecting an exchange rate regime. See for example Aghevli et al. (1991), Edwards and 
Tabellini (1994), Collins (1996), Edwards (1996), Agénor and Montiel (1996). The 
main point of this literature is to stress that it may be politically more costly to adjust a 
pegged exchange rate than to allow the nominal exchange rate to fluctuate. In a flexible 
exchange rate regime, a variation in the nominal rate might not be noticed or might not 
be linked to government policy in people’s minds, as would be the case if the currency 
was devalued. This implies that the decision to adopt flexible exchange rate is partly 
taken to ‘de-politicize’ exchange rate adjustments.  
The bottom line is that the process of selecting an exchange regime for a developing 
country depends on the structural characteristics of the economy, the nature and source 
of the shocks and political considerations. This paper develops an analytical framework 
allowing us to determine the size of costs and benefits of CFA membership for member 
states. Indeed, the experience of this zone illustrates the main trade-off involved in the 
choice of an exchange rate regime. Despite the 1994 devaluation, the member countries 
continue to commit themselves to a fixed exchange rate regime, to anchor their price 
levels and to maintain inflation close to the rate experienced in Europe. Such a policy 
has resulted in a weakening of their ability to adjust to external shocks to the domestic 
economy. Indeed by selecting a flexible regime, they would have been able to limit the 
damage caused by the volatility of their export prices and of the international interest 
rate.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 analyzes briefly the link between the 
economic performance of the CFA countries and the exchange rate system. Section 2 
describes a typical CFA country as a small open developing country which produces 
tradable as well as semi-tradables goods, and which is affected by external shocks. 
Section 3 considers the preferences of policy makers who behave strategically to decide 
whether to adopt an irrevocably fixed or a flexible exchange rate regime. The model 
assumes that the authorities minimize a quadratic loss function that captures the trade-
off between inflation and real growth in the tradable sector. The authorities’ decision 
process takes into account the expected value of a quadratic loss function under 
alternative exchange rate regimes. Section 4 extends the model by considering political 
factors. As a pegged exchange rate is not irrevocably fixed, the policy makers have to 
choose between intermediate exchange rate arrangements such as a fixed but adjustable 
exchange rate and a flexible managed exchange rate. The last section offers some 
concluding remarks.   3
1  Economic performance and the exchange rate system: the CFA zone 
The objective of this section is to analyze the costs and benefits of CFA membership for 
member states through the analysis of the relationship between the economic 
performance of the CFA zone countries and the zone’s institutional arrangements. 
The CFA arrangement differs from usual currency boards in several respects. First, CFA 
countries have to keep at least 65 per cent of their foreign exchange reserves with the 
French Treasury. The latter provides an overdraft facility which is unbounded in 
principle but not in practice since monetary policies have to be tightened when the 
reserve position deteriorates. Second, with 14 countries sharing one of two same 
currencies, devaluation is a complex operation requiring the consensus of many Heads 
of State. Third, when the devaluation occurred in 1994, CFA countries decided to 
harmonize their economic policies and monetary unions became economic and 
monetary unions. 
The benefits of the exchange rate as an anchor can be assessed by comparing CFA 
economic performance to that of other African countries with a flexible exchange rate 
regime. Performance might be measured in terms of inflation, economic growth and the 
balance of payments. The other African countries have much in common with CFA 
zone members regarding economic development, diversity and the effects of terms of 
trade shocks. The link between the exchange rate regime and the economic performance 
shows that there are three benefits and three major potential costs of the CFA Franc as a 
monetary standard.  
The first advantage of the exchange rate regime is the monetary discipline stemming 
from adherence to an external monetary standard. The clearest evidence for this 
discipline is that the CFA zone countries have performed relatively well in terms of 
price stability. As shown by the table below, there has been lower inflation in CFA zone 
countries in comparison with the non-CFA countries. 
However as Boughton (1993) has noted, the discipline argument should not be oversold, 
as a country’s exchange rate arrangements may promote but not guarantee discipline. 
Financial pressures in the 1980s led to a banking crisis in Cameroon and increases in 
tariff and non-tariff barriers (with negative effects on growth) in the Ivory Coast. The 
overall growth record of the CFA zone countries was sufficiently strong in the 1980s to 
suggest that the benefit of price stability was more than an illusion. GDP growth was 
higher in the CFA up to the beginning of the 1970s, with an average of 3.9 per cent 
annual growth, and remained strong in the oil-producing countries of the BEAC during 
1973-85, with 12.2 per cent annual growth: nearly twice that of other sub-Saharan 
African countries. But average inflation picked up substantially, from an average of 4 
per cent before 1973 to an average of 11.6 per cent during 1973-85. When the terms of 
trade deteriorated in the second half of the 1980s, the parity with the French franc 
remained unchanged and the CFA Franc became overvalued. This led to the erosion of 
the competitive position of the zone, and the 1986-93 depression was more severe in 
CFA than non-CFA countries. GDP growth decreased to less than 1 per cent in the 
CFA, in contrast to other sub-Saharan countries where GDP growth amounted to 2.4 per 
cent during that period. CFA countries were then penalized by the delay in adjusting the 
value of the currency. During the post-devaluation recovery period (1994-2001), GDP 











The second positive aspect of the CFA zone currency arrangement relates to the 
credibility of a multinational institutional structure. Agénor and Montiel (1996) 
developed a theoretical framework for developing countries in which joining a currency 
union was one form of reputation-enhancing policy. The particularly good fiscal 
performance recorded in the CFA zone until 1973 resulted from strict compliance with 
the rules of the central banks and conservative monetary policies restricting lending to 
governments to statutory limits. However, after 1973 fiscal performance deteriorated 
because rules for a minimum level of foreign reserves and a limit to central bank 
lending to governments were broken (Fielding 2002). The average CFA budget deficit, 
which averaged 1.3 per cent of GDP during 1960-73, dropped to 5 per cent of GDP 
during 1973-85 then to 7.4 per cent of GDP during the recession period. After the 1994 
devaluation, the budget deficit was reduced to 1.9 per cent of GDP on average in 1994-
2001. It has become increasingly difficult to argue that participation in the unions has 
served as an effective constraint on member states.  
The final positive factor, which may be the most important for the membership of the 
CFA zone, is the access to France and to Europe which has taken several forms and has 
generated the growth of trade and output. First of all, roughly two-thirds of the total 
international trade of the CFA countries is with France or with European Union 
countries. It should be stressed that the trade relations of the CFA countries with the 
European Union countries other than France are fairly significant. Moreover, the 
importance of France as a trading partner has tended to decline over time, from nearly 
half of all international trade of the CFA countries in the middle of the 1960s to 30 per 
cent at the end of the 1990s. During 1990-96, European Union countries absorbed 50 
per cent of the exports from, and provided 53 per cent of the imports to the CFA 
countries. So the main economic risk would be a potential appreciation of the real 
exchange rate of the CFA countries due to a strong and volatile euro which might 
weaken the external competitiveness of CFA countries. 
However, full currency convertibility and an absence of restrictions on capital 
movements provides the countries of the zone with access to European finance. Finally, 
the CFA countries have benefitted from important official financial support from 
Economic performance in the CFA and non-CFA countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
1/
(Annual average, in per cent)
1960-73 1973-85 1986-93 1994-2001
CFA  non CFA  CFA  non CFA  CFA  non CFA  CFA  non CFA 
2/
Inflation 3.9 4.2 11.6 18.6 6.2 31.9 7.7 18.0
GDP Growth  3.9 4.0 7.3 2.2 0.4 2.4 3.8 3.0
Gross investment/GDP 14.7 14.4 22.2 16.3 17.3 18.3 20.3 19.0
Overall fiscal balance/GDP -1.3 -2.0 -5.1 -5.9 -7.4 -4.6 -2.0 -3.8
External current  n.a. -1.0 -6.0 -8.8 -6.5 -7.1 -4.9 -11.1
account balance/GDP
Source: International Financial Statistics, World Development Indicators, Banque de France
1/Burundi, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo Dem. Rep., Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
2/Excluding Congo Dem. Rep. and Guinea-Bissau
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France. An external deficit for a member country will result in a loss of reserves and a 
fall in the balance held by the regional central bank on behalf of the country in the 
Operations Account at the French Treasury.  
There are three drawbacks of CFA membership. The two major potential costs of the 
system are the loss of the exchange rate as a policy instrument and the risk of 
overvaluation. Before 1973, the investment ratio of the CFA zone members (was about 
14.7 per cent of GDP) was close to that of other sub-Saharan African countries. But 
thereafter the investment ratio of the non-CFA countries continued to increase, while it 
decreased in the CFA zone as a result of significant reduction of private investment and 
cuts in public investment after 1985. However, after the 1994 devaluation, the 
investment ratio in the CFA zone increased, peaking at nearly 20.3 per cent of GDP 
during 1994-2001. This is consistent with the conjecture that the exchange rate system 
contributed to some cyclicality in key economic variables. 
The third potential weaknesses of the CFA zone is that it contributes to a lack of intra-
regional trade. Intra-regional trade accounts for less than 10 per cent of the international 
trade of the CFA zone, whereas it amounts to more than half of the international trade of 
the European Union countries. Price and wage flexibility have been limited. Across the 
CFA zone countries, there is a diversity of production and trade structure, and the impact 
of terms of trade shocks has varied widely. As reported Boughton (1993), the 
implication of this diversity is that if the exchange rate were to be changed in an attempt 
to adjust to movements in the terms of trade, the required magnitude of the devaluation 
would, in all likelihood, not be uniform across countries.  
2 The  theoretical  model 
This section presents a simple static log-linear model of a country of the CFA zone as a 
small open economy which will serve as the basis for discussion of alternative exchange 
rate regimes. This simple model constitutes the basic framework used for the analytical 
discussions assessing the costs of CFA membership.  
2.1  The supply side 
The model is based on the dependent economy model of Swan (1963). This is a simple 
model of a small open economy which produces both tradable and semi-tradable goods. 
This production structure relaxes the fixed-price constraint that is imposed by a small 
country assumption. Owing to its relatively small size the country is a price-taker in the 
world market of tradable goods and the export sector is the traditional, price-taking 
sector. The rest of the economy produces a semi-tradable good which is imperfectly 
substitutable with the imported commodity (Devarajan and De Melo 1987). 
The whole country’s production is assumed to cover the two sectors: 
TS T    y yy =+            ( 1 )  
where y is the logarithm of the output, yT is the logarithm of the production of tradable 
goods and yST is the logarithm of the production of semi-tradable goods.    6
Following the models in Barro and Gordon (1983), Devarajan and Rodrik (1992) and 
Edwards (1996), the equation for the output level in the tradable sector, yT, is expressed 
as follows:  
  TT S T T    (-   )     ( -   yy x x λπ π µ =+ + )        (2) 
where yT is the logarithm of the natural level of tradable output, π T and π ST are the rates 
of increase in the price of tradables and semi-tradables. (π T-π ST) stands for the change in 
the real exchange rate. x is a composite variable encompassing the logarithm of the 
terms of trade and world interest shocks, reflecting the existence of an income effect. x 
is the mean level of x, assumed to have a variance equal to σ ². The parameters λ  and µ 
are positive.  
Similarly total output y is determined by two variables, the change in the real exchange 
rate (π T-π ST) and the composite variable x: 
TS T      (  -     )    ( -   ) yy x x γπ π φ =+ +         ( 3 )  
where y  is the natural level of output and the parameters γ  and φ  are positive. In 
equations (2) and (3), an increase in the price of tradables, π ST relative to the rate of 
increase in the tradables price, π T, implies a decrease in real exchange rate. This real 
appreciation reflects an increase in the domestic cost of producing tradable goods and 
lowers both total and traded output, as do values of x were below the mean x.  
2.2  The demand side 
As in Minford (1998), demand is composed of the demand of tradable goods, DT and 
the demand of semi-tradable goods, DST 
D = DT  + DST          ( 4 )  
The demand curve for tradable goods is determined by two variables, the demand in real 
terms for traded goods, τ D and the change in the real exchange rate (π T-π ST): 
  TS T   (-  ) T DD τη π π =+          ( 5 )  
where η  is positive, τ  = yT/ y  is a parameter representing the share of the traded output 
in total output with 0 < τ  <1. 
Equation (4) states that the demand in the semi-tradables sector is the difference 
between the total demand for goods and the demand for tradable goods: 
DST =D - DT      
Equilibrium in the semi-tradables market is given by: 
DST = yST           ( 6 )  











3  The model of the choice of an exchange rate regime 
This section develops a simple theoretical model with policy makers behaving 
strategically under alternative exchange rate regimes in a country of the CFA zone. This 
approach relies on the existence of a trade-off between credibility provided by rules that 
govern economy policy and flexibility allowing the governments to apply discretionary 
policy after evaluating the situation. It should be made clear that the authorities use 
discretion to alter the nominal exchange rate. To establish credibility the authorities 
must convince the public that they are committed to defend the parity which has been 
clearly defined and stop implementing previously announced policies which would lead 
to time-inconsistency problems (for a survey on this literature, see for example Barro 
and Gordon (1983), Persson and Tabellini (1990), Agénor and Montiel (1996)). 
A pegged exchange system is assumed to allow the policy makers to resolve, (if only 
partially) the time inconsistency problem. It has been argued that the adoption of a fixed 
exchange rate will constrain the ability of governments to surprise the public through 
unexpected devaluations.  
The authorities’ loss function  
Consider the case of a small economy in a developing-country context whose policy 
makers behave strategically to decide whether to adopt a (permanently) pegged or a 
flexible exchange rate regime. The authorities’ decision process takes into account and 
compares the expected value of a quadratic loss function under alternative exchange rate 
regimes. 
The authorities are assumed to be interested in minimizing an objective function in both 
nominal and real variables. The real variable could be the current account, output, or the 
growth rate. The nominal variable could be the price level or inflation. A zero inflation 
rate is not an equilibrium. It would never be rational for people to anticipate a zero 
inflation rate. If they did so, the government would always have an incentive to set a 
  
Table 1. A simple small open economy  
DT = τ D+η (π T-π ST)       (5) 
 y =  y+γ (π T-π ST)+φ (x- x)     (3)
 yT  = yT+λ (π T-π ST)+µ(x- x)     (2) 
 y = yT+yST         (1) 
D = DST+DT         (4) 
DST = D-DT         (6) 
D = y          (7) 
Where: y=output (in log);  y( yT)= natural level of output (traded 
output); D(DST) = demand in real terms (in semi-tradeables sector); 
with parameters γ≥ 0,  φ≥ 0,  α≥ 0, β≥ 0,  η≥ 0 and τ (= yT/ y), natural 
share of traded output in the total output, 0<τ <1; in logarithm: π T-π ST
= change in real exchange  rate; x = random variable reflecting  
external shocks received by the economy;  x =  the mean level of 
external shocks.    8
positive inflation rate. The model assumes that what matters most to policy makers is 
inflation and the competitiveness in the tradable sector. The policy makers’ preferences 
are formalized as follow: 
   [ ] (* ) ² ( * ) ² TT L Ε yy ππ ϕ =− + − , ϕ  > 0        (3.1) 
where E is an expectations operator, L, the loss function which depends on squared 
deviations of inflation from a socially optimal target value, π *  and on squared 
deviations of level of output in the tradable sector from a desired target level yT*. 
The structural economic constraints 
The authorities’ behaviour is subject to the constraints imposed by the economy’s 
structural characteristics and its susceptibility to external shocks. In section 2, the level 
of output in the tradables sector has been set as a function of the magnitude of 
fluctuation in the real exchange rate (π T-π ST) and the external disturbances in terms of 
trade and world interest shocks, x:  
     TT S T T    (-   )     ( -   yy x x απ π β =+ + )      (3.2) 
 
Following Kydland and Prescott (1977), it is assumed that the natural rate of (traded) 
output,  yT, is lower than the socially optimal level, yT*: 
yT*>  yT          (3.3) 
where yT* = τ y* (y* is the target level of total output and τ  = yT/  y represents the 
natural share of traded output in total output). Equation (3.3) assumes that the target 
level of traded output exceeds its natural level. The sub-optimality of the natural level of 
traded output could be due to pre-existing rigidities in labour market or to various 
distortions in taxation (Devarajan and Rodrik 1992). The determinants of changes in 
domestic prices have to be specified to close the model. It is assumed that the domestic 
price setters are rational and forward-looking. The price in the semi-traded sector is set 
so as to protect their position relative to the traded sector and to respond to the 
exogenous disturbances. The foreign-currency price of traded goods is determined on 
the world market. Domestic inflation, π , is given by: 
   (1 ) ST T πλ π λ π =+ −         (3.4) 
where domestic inflation is a weighted average of the increases in the prices of semi-
tradables and tradables and (1-δ ) is the degree of openness. The domestic price of the 
tradable sector takes the following form: 
   TT
e d ππ =+          (3.5) 
where d represents the rate of devaluation of the nominal exchange rate and  T
e π  the rate 
of increase in the foreign currency price of tradable goods. As in Dornbusch (1980), it is   9
assumed for simplicity that the foreign price is set at one, and  0 T
e π = . Equation (3.5) 
becomes: 
   T d π =         (3.6) 
Since domestic price setters are rational and forward-looking, they set prices in the 
semi-tradable sector in reaction to fluctuations in the expected domestic price of 
tradable goods, and to exogenous shocks in their sector, XN, which occur at the 
beginning of the period. Following Agénor and Montiel (1996), the domestic price 
setters’ objective is to minimize their loss function, taken to be:  
  Min  LP ]      (  )       ² / 2
a e
TN ST
d   π ψ π + =− − Χ   , ψ  > 0    (3.a) 
where d
a denotes the expected rate of depreciation of the exchange rate.  
After some manipulation the first order condition gives: 
 
P L




a d ππ ψ
π
∂
=⇔ − + − Χ =
∂
      (3.b) 
The optimal rate of inflation in the semi-tradable sector is: 
  ST N
a d πψ =+ Χ          ( 3 . c )  
Under rational expectations, the agents take into account the expected relative price 
behaviour and the expected external disturbances: 
  () (-  ) ST E dE x x πδ =−         (3.7) 
with 
a d =E(d) and  N Χ = E( -  x x ). The timing therefore supposes that external shocks 
occur after the expected changes in domestic prices have been set (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Timing of events 
  Step 1    Step 2    Step 3    Step 4 
  π ST  is set  the shocks occur 




d is set 
traded output yT




The sequence of the actions influences the model’s solution. Initially, the agents form 
rational expectations of the change in prices in the semi-tradables sector before they 
observe x, d, π  and yT. The policy makers determine exchange rate policy once both π ST 
and x have been revealed. The authorities’ objective is to set the exchange rate system to 












3.1 The credibility of the pegged regime as a rule 
The objective in this sub-section is to measure the welfare cost derived from the policy 
makers’ commitment to a fixed exchange rate and not to adjust it in the context of 
adverse external shock. 
In this case, no surprise change in parity can be expected when the authorities are 
deciding an optimal rule. Thus, under rational expectations, E(d)=d and equation (3.7) 
becomes: 
  π =E(d)= d          (3.d) 
Substituting (3.6) and (3.7) in (3.4) yields π =π ST = d (note that E(x- x) =0) and the 
optimal policy for the government is provided by the first order condition: 










Peg = π* = πST =d        ( 3 . 8 )  
The inflation stays on target with the socially optimal value that is implicit in equation 
(3.2), taking the form: 
   ()
Peg
TT yy x x β =+ −         ( 3 . 9 )  
   Table 2. Optimization programme
Min L = L[π (d),yT(d)] 
       d 
under 
yT= yT + α ( π T - π ST)+β ( x- x )        (3.2)  
      yT*> yT         (3.3) 
 π  = λπ ST + (1-λ )d       (3.4) 
π T = d + π T
e with  π T
e=0     (3.6) 
π ST = E(d) + δ E(x - x)       (3.7) 
 
with  L = quadratic  loss function; (π ,yT) = 
inflation rate and traded output  ; (π *,yT*)  = 
inflation rate and socially optimal traded 
output; yT  =  natural traded output; (π T-π ST) =  
change in real exchange rate;  π T ( π ST) = 
inflation rate in the tradable sector (semi-
tradable sector); d = rate of depreciation; π T
e= 
foreign inflation rate; x  = random variable 
reflecting external shocks received by the 
economy;   x  = the mean level of external 
shocks. 
E(x)= x and V(x) = σ ²; parameters : ϕ >0, α >0, 
β >0, δ >0, 0<λ <1.   11
Equation (3.9) is the equilibrium level of traded output. By plugging (3.8) and (3.9) in 
(3.1), the expected value of the loss function is expressed: 
  
* (( )² ² ²)
Peg
TT Ly y ϕβ σ =− +        ( 3 . 1 0 )  
In this case, where the policy makers are pursuing a fixed exchange rate and agents 
know that the public will not be subjected to an inflationary policy, the loss function is 
positive. In order to compare this exchange rate system with the situation that would 
arise if the government implemented a flexible exchange system, the social loss under 
discretionary policy will now be calculated. 
3.2  The discretionary policy under flexible exchange rate regime 
Consider the case of flexible exchange rate management whereby authorities and agents 
under rational expectations define the equilibrium value of inflation and the level of 
traded production. The authorities know the rate of inflation set in the semi-tradable 
sector. Following the impact of the external shocks on the domestic economy the policy 
makers set d as an optimal rate of adjustment of the nominal exchange rate.  
Equation (3.1) in terms of d, π ST, x gives: 
( )
2 2 * (, ,) ( ( 1 ) * ) ( ( ) ( ) ST ST T ST T Ld x E d y d x x y πλ π π ϕ α π β   =+ − − + + − + − −    
 (3.11) 
The corresponding first condition is: 
0( 1 ) ² ( 1 ) ( * ) ²² ( * ) () 0 ST ST
L
dd y t y x x T d
λλ λ π π ϕ α α π α β
∂  = ⇒ −+ − −+ − + − + −=  ∂
 
(3.e) 
By re-arranging this expression the final solution for d, the optimal exchange rate 
adjustment rule, is given as follows: 
() ( ) { }
1 * ²( 1) ² ² ( 1) ( 1) * ( ) ( ) ST T T dy y x x α ϕ λ α ϕ λ λ π λ π αϕ αβϕ
−
=+ − − − + −+ − − − (3.12) 
Equation (3.12) represents the authorities’ reaction function where d is related to price 
changes in the semi-tradable sector, to the nominal and real objectives followed by the 
government, and external shocks received by the economy.  
Assume that the authorities place sufficient importance on the real target so as to allow 
that  ∆ =(α ²ϕ +(1-λ )²)
-1>0. Should the rate of inflation increase in the semi-tradable 
sector, the government will accelerate the depreciation rate of the currency. However, 
this effect will be mitigated if devaluation makes the semi-tradable goods cheaper than 
the tradable goods: 
  






<= ∆ − − <
∂
      (3.f)   12
Then price change in the semi-tradable good induced by the change in demand tends to 
reduce the desirability of more flexible exchange rates.  
When adverse external shocks occur, the government will force a depreciation of the 
domestic currency: 







        ( 3 . g )  
This is the main advantage of the flexible exchange rate regime that protects the 
domestic economy from negative external shocks, especially for CFA countries with a 
price-taking external sector subject to world commodity price volatility.  
The reduction of the target value of inflation calls for an appreciation of the domestic 
currency: 








        ( 3 . h )  
Considering the policy makers’ target for tradable output, assuming that yT*>  yT , the 
government is always tempted to boost economic activity by implementing an 
inflationary policy: 
   0







       (3.i) 
The rate of devaluation increases, allowing the government to gain political support. 
To find out the equilibrium inflation rate under a flexible exchange rate system, agents 
in the private sector with rational expectations take into account the optimal exchange 
rate adjustment rule (3.12).  




() ² ( 1 ) ²
* ²( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( * ) ( ) () TT
Ed
Ed E Ey y Ex x
αϕ λ
α ϕ λ λ λ π αϕ αβϕ
−
=+ −
−− + − + −− −
   (3.13) 
Assuming that π ST = E(d) = d, E(yT*- yT) = yT*- yT and noting that E(π
*) = π
* and  
E(x- x) = 0, we have: 
* (1 ) ( ) ( ) * ( )
1




−= + + −
−
       (3.j) 
The expected change in the exchange rate and the subsequent price change in semi-
tradable goods is:   13
 
* () * (  )
1




== = + −
−       ( 3 . k )  
Substituting equation (3.k) into equation (3.13) gives: 
()** ²( 1 ) * ( ) ( 1 ) * ( ) ()
1
TT TT dy y y y x x
αϕ
αϕ λ λ π λπ α ϕ α β ϕ
λ
  =∆ − − + − + − + − − −   −  
 
           ( 3 . l )  
After some simplification, the equilibrium level of the exchange rate depreciation can be 
expressed as: 
  * *( ) ( )
1




 =+ −− ∆ −  − 
              (3.14) 
The equilibrium level of inflation under flexible exchange rates is given by substituting 
equation (3.l) and (3.14) into equation (3.4): 
** *() ( 1 ) *( ) ( )
11
Flex
TT T T yy yy x x
αϕ αϕ
πλ π λ π α β ϕ
λλ
   =+ − + − + − − ∆ −    −−   
 (3.m) 
Simplifying, and noting that π
Peg =π *: 
  * () ( 1 ) (
1
Flex Peg
TT yy x x
αϕ
ππ α β ϕ λ
λ
 =+ − − − ∆ −  − 
)     (3.15) 
Equation (3.15) gives the level of domestic inflation under flexible exchange rates. For a 
given real objective, it appears that inflation is higher under a flexible exchange rate 
regime as compared to the pegged one. The expansionary policy represented by the 
discrepancy (yT*- yT ) is inflationary, notwithstanding the fact that such discretionary 
policy facilitates adjustment of the real exchange rate when external disturbances occur.  
Indeed, by substituting equations (3.6) and (3.7) into equation (3.2), and noting that  
E(x- x) = 0 and that d is given by (3.14), the equilibrium of the traded output can be 
expressed as follows: 
   (1 )² ( )
Flex
T yy x x
T
λβ =+ − ∆−       (3.16) 
with ∆  = (α ²ϕ  + (1-λ )²)
-1. Equation (3.16) shows that since (1-λ )²∆  < 1, discretionary 
exchange rate adjustment allows the level of traded output to be less sensitive to the 
adverse external shocks as compared to the fixed exchange rate case where 
()
Peg
TT yy x x β =+ − . Moreover:  
   ²()
Flex Peg
T yy x x T αϕ β =− ∆ −        ( 3 . 1 7 )  
Equation (3.17) establishes that due to the target set in the real sector, traded output is 
higher (lower) under flexible rates than under fixed rates in case of negative (positive)   14
external shocks. Consider the variance of traded output in the alternative exchange rate 
regime: 
σ ²y
Peg=  yT²+β ²σ ² and σ ²y
Flex =  yT²+(1-λ )
4β ²σ ²   ⇒ σ ²y
Peg >σ ²y
Flex (3.n) 
Expression (3.n) shows that the variance is higher under a pegged regime than under a 
flexible exchange rate system. This means that a flexible exchange system, despite an 
inflationary bias caused by (yT*- yT ), allows a reduction in traded output variability.  
Given π T
Flex and yT
Flex, the expected value of the loss function under discretion is obtained 
by plugging (3.15) and (3.16) into (3.1) to get (after some simplification): 
                          L
Flex = (α ²ϕ ²/(1-λ )² + ϕ  )(yT* - yT)² + ϕβ ²(1-λ )²∆ σ ²      (3.18) 
Expression (3.18) is also positive, and in order to evaluate alternative exchange rate 
regimes the authorities have to compare the expected value of the loss function under 
both cases. 
3.3  Welfare comparison of the two exchange rate regime 
The optimal exchange rate regime is the one that minimizes the expected value of the 




Peg}          ( 3 . 1 9 )  
If K<0 then a flexible exchange rate regime is preferable 
If K>0 then a fixed exchange rate regime is preferable 
By incorporating equations (3.10) and (3.18) into equation (3.19) and after some 
manipulation, equation (3.10) can be rewritten as: 
 K=α ²ϕ ²[(yT* - yT)²/(1-λ )²- β ²∆ σ ² ]        ( 3 . 2 0 )  
This expression means that in order for K to be positive, allowing the fixed exchange 
rate to be preferred, the differential (yT* - yT) that measures the government ambition to 









The higher the gap between the socially optimal traded output and the natural rate of 
traded output, the more intense the government’s aversion is to an expansionary policy 
that overheats the economy and depreciates the currency. In this case, the fixed 
exchange system will be preferred.  
Note specifically, (yT* - yT) should exceed the variance of the external shocks σ².   15
However, the more weight is placed on the real target ϕ , the more preferable is the fixed 







This seems quite paradoxical since the advantage of a fixed exchange rate system lies in 
a low inflation rate at the expense of the real target. If the authorities give much more 
importance to the real target (in order to develop the profitability of the tradable sector) 
than to reducing inflation, they will have the temptation to abuse their discretionary 
power to alter the nominal exchange rate, leading to inflationary costs.  
However, in case of a small open economy, the higher its susceptibility to external 






. In addition the 
higher the variance of these external shocks σ², the better a flexible exchange rate will 








Finally the model suggests that a developing economy with less inflationary propensity 
will be better off by adopting a flexible exchange rate regime in order to protect the 
profitability of the tradable sector and to reduce traded output variability. Furthermore, 
the more a small open developing economy is susceptible to the volatility caused by 
external shocks, the more it will be tempted to select a flexible exchange rate regime. 
4  Fixed but adjustable versus flexible exchange rate regime 
This extension of the exchange regime choice model tries to capture some real world 
features important for a developing country. First, a fixed exchange rate is rarely 
irrevocably fixed: in practice, pegs are frequently adjusted. Next, ‘flexible’ exchange 
rate regimes typically involve extensive bureaucratic management. So when the 
authorities clearly commit themselves to defend the established parity, the incentives to 
move away from the pegged currency could depend on the country’s prevailing political 
and institutional characteristics. The model will try to formalize the role of external 
political factors, such as the special relationship with France and also the internal ones 
derived, from the institutional rules and political cycles that must be considered when 
choosing an exchange rate regime.  
4.1  Sources and measures of political instability 
In most developing countries, four sources of political instability can be identified: lack 
of administrative capacity, overzealous government rules and regulations, rent-seeking 
behaviour and inefficient political cycles. (For extensive reviews and discussion see 
Nordhaus 1975, North 1990, Cukierman et al. 1992, and Persson and Tabellini 1994).  
A state is weak when the sources of political instability are numerous and widespread, a 
situation that can be found in both democratic and dictatorial political systems. The 
degree of political instability can be measured by the probability ρ for a government at 
the beginning of the period t of losing an election rather than surviving in office to the 
next period t+1. Following Baudasse et al. (1994), the degree of instability, ρ varies 
according to the degree of weakness or strength of the state, the external and domestic   16




((1 ) )χ ρϖ κ =−    with  0<κ <1      (3.21) 
where ϖ  measure the strength or the weakness state during the period and: if ϖ  =0 then 
government is weak and its relations with the private sector are not satisfactory. The 
political system is weak where rent seeking is rampant. In such a case it is likely to 
reject fixed exchange rate commitment.  
If  ϖ  =1 then the government is strong. The public sector operates under strict 
commercial principles and macroeconomic performance is superior. 
κ   represents political external and domestic pressures. On the international side, a 
government that has an incentive not to honour its commitments, even if the situation is 
one of a fixed exchange rate, incurs a loss of credibility. In this case the government is 
weak and conveys bad signals about its ability to implement reform programmes. 
Internally, when facing forthcoming elections, the government seeking re-election has 
short-run incentives to renounce a fixed exchange rate to pursue an inflationary policy. 
χ  represents the instability of the political system in terms of replacements of the head 
of the state. The lower is 1/χ  , the more the government instability there is and hence the 
higher is ρ and also the higher the possibility of losing an election. 
The decision to ‘tie one’s hand’ when joining a fixed-exchange rate arrangement is not 
irrevocable (Obstfeld 1994). The decision is a political decision. Some types of political 
instability weaken the exchange rate system (Eichengreen and Simmons 1993). 
According to Edwards (1996), a government can decide ex ante to adopt a flexible 
exchange rate arrangement in order to avoid the political cost induced by exchange rate 
depreciation. So the political costs can be measured as follows: 
  C = C(ρ) with C’>0        ( 4 . 1 )  
where the extent of the costs following reneging on the fix parity depend on the political 
system (democratic or not), the degree of stability and the nature of the state (weak or 
strong). This is the reason why generally devaluation occurs in the governments’ very 
early stages when its degree of popularity is higher. Klein and Marion (1994) show that 
the probability of a devaluation increases immediately after a replacement of the head of 
the state. Furthermore, the degree of political instability has an influence on the 
government’s time preference through the discount factor θ defined as follows:   
  θ = θ (ρ) with θ’  < 0         ( 4 . 2 )  
The weaker the probability of the policymakers in an unstable system being re-elected at 
the beginning of the next period (ρ higher), the more political decisions will favour short 
term action (the discount factor θ is small) and the more the temptation to devalue.   17
4.2  The loss function under flexible and fixed but-adjustable exchange rate 
regimes  
The preceding analysis assumes a fixed exchange rate regime with rules in place to 
prevent any alteration of the exchange rate. However, for a small developing country, 
there are costs associated with surrendering the use of the exchange rate as a policy 
instrument, particularly in the presence of large external shocks (Agénor and Montiel 
1996). In practice, exchange rate arrangements involving a peg typically incorporate an 
‘escape clause’ or a contingency mechanism that allows deviation from the declared 
parity under exceptional circumstances (Flood and Isard 1989). 
Assume, in the context of the model above, that developing countries are faced with 
external shocks, and the authorities can maintain a fixed parity when the external shocks 
are small but are allowed to alter the fixed exchange rate discretionarily if the foreign 
shocks are large. The probability that the escape clause will be invoked and a 
discretionary policy followed is: 
    q = Prob( | x |
 ≤  µ),   with 0 ≤  q ≤  1, 0 < µ ≤  c     (4.3) 
where x is the composite external shocks variable having a uniform distribution over the 
interval (0, c), c representing a given threshold. The agents form expectations before the 
realization of the external shocks.  
We can introduce the possibility of this fixed but adjustable exchange rate regime as an 
alternative to a flexible exchange rate regime. Consider two periods, t and t+1, where 
under a pegged regime there is a positive probability q that the peg will be abandoned at 
the end of the first period t. Denote the discount factor by θ(ρ) and assume that the 
authorities incur a political cost C(ρ) if the peg is abandoned. In this two-period 
economy, the loss function is expressed as follows: 
   1 LL L t t θ =+ +         ( 4 . 4 )  
As in the preceding analysis, the authorities have a distaste for inflation and for output 
deviations from a target level in the initial period t: 
   ( *)² ( *)² T Ly y t tt γ ππ ϕ =− + −       (4.5) 
where γ  represent the weight attached to the distaste for inflation and ϕ  the weight 
attached to the real target.  
The loss function under flexible exchange rate regime is denoted: 
   1
Flex Flex Flex
tt LL L θ + =+         ( 4 . 6 )  
which can also be expressed as: 
[ ]
1 1 ( *)² ( *)² ( *)² ( *)²
t
Flex Flex Flex Flex Flex
tT t T t T T Ly y y y γπ π ϕ θ γπ π ϕ
+ + =− + − + − + −  (4.7)   18
Equation (4.7) indicates that social costs increase with squared deviations of inflation 
from a socially optimal target value, π * and on squared deviations of the level of output 
in the tradable sector from a desired target level yT* in the two periods t and t+1. 
Under the fixed but adjustable regime the loss function is expressed as follows: 
   1
Peg Peg Peg
tt LL L θ + =+                         (4.8) 
At the end of the period t, the agents expect that with a probability (1-q) the authorities 
will maintain a pegged regime, and that with probability q the peg will be abandoned 
with a political cost equal to C. When the escape clause is exercised the country is 
assumed to move into a flexible system with probability q and to keep a fixed parity 
with probability (1-q), so that during the second period t+1, the loss function is as 
follows: 
{ }
1 1 11 1 (1 )( ( *)² ( *)²) ( ( *)² ( *)²)
t t
Fixe Fixe Peg D D
tt T T t T T Lq y y q y y q C βγ π π ϕ γ π π ϕ
+ + ++ + = − −+ − + −+ − +  





t+1 denote the value of inflation and traded output in the second period, 
t+1, under the devaluation scenario. This means that once the peg is abandoned they 
will be determined as under the flexible system:  11
D Flex
tt ππ ++ =  and  11
D Flex
Tt Tt yy ++ = .  
So the loss function under the pegged regime in the two-period economy is: 
{ 11 ( *)² ( *)² (1 )( ( *)² ( *)²)
Peg Peg Peg Peg Peg
tT t T t t Ly y q y y TT γπ π ϕ θ γπ π ϕ ++ =− + − + − − + −  
+ } 11 (( * ) ² ( * ) ² )
Flex Flex
tT t T qy y q C γπ π ϕ ++ −+ − +        (4.10) 
Equation (4.10) indicates that the social loss increases with both the authorities’ time 
preference and the probability q of abandoning the pegged regime, and also with the 
deviations of inflation and traded output from their socially optimal levels. 
Assume that the country can choose ex ante between these two possible exchange rate 
regimes: flexible nominal rates or fixed but adjustable rates. The regime choice will be 
based on a comparison of the appropriate expected loss functions. 
4.3  Decisions rules applied to the selection process of an exchange rate regime  
As in the preceding analysis, the authorities compare the expected value of the loss 
function under both exchange rate systems. The optimal exchange rate regime is the one 
minimizing the expected value of the authorities’ loss function. The determination of the 
best exchange system depends on the following criterion: 
K= E{L
Flex- L
Peg}          ( 4 . 1 1 )  
If K<0 then a flexible exchange rate regime is preferable 
If K>0 then a fixed exchange rate regime is preferable   19
By substitution of expressions (4.7) and (4.8) in (4.9), expression (4.11) becomes: 
{ [ ] 11 ( *)² ( *)² ( *)² ( *)²
( *)² ( *)²




KE y y y y
Peg y y
γπ π ϕ θ γπ π ϕ
γπ π ϕ
++ =− + − + − + − −
−− −
{ 11 (1 )( ( *)² ( *)²)
Peg Peg
tt qy y θγ π π ϕ ++ −− −+ −  
+ } } 11 ( ( *)² ( *)²)
Flex Flex
tt qy y q C γπ π ϕ ++ −+ − +        (4.12) 
By plugging (3.8), (3.9), (3.15) and (3.16) into expression (4.10), and in addition 






Peg , K becomes: 
[ ]
24
1 ( *)² (1 )( *)² ² ² 1 (1 ))((1 ) ² 1)
Flex Flex
t Kq q q C γπ π θ γ π π ϕ β σ θ λ θ + =− + − − + + − − ∆ − −
           ( 4 . 1 3 )  
The sign of K is indeterminate; but considering first order conditions will shed light on 
the likelihood of choosing between fixed but adjustable (K > 0) and flexible exchange 
rate (K < 0) regime.  
From equation (4.13), it is possible to derive a number of hypotheses regarding the 
likelihood that a country will choose the fixed but adjustable exchange rate regime.  
Consider the changes in prices under flexible rates: 











        (4.13a) 
  and 
1 1
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     (4.13b) 
In either period a higher rate of inflation under flexible rates increases the probability 
ex ante of the policymaker choosing a pegged regime.  
Moreover a higher distaste for inflation (γ) will also increase the likelihood of choosing 
the pegged regime:  








== − + − >
∂
           (4.14) 
The higher is the government weight attached to fighting against inflation, the more a 
fixed system will be chosen ex ante to favour monetary discipline and reduce 
inflationary pressures. 
We can consider political factors, and particularly the authorities’ time preference, in 
the selection process of an exchange rate regime: 
4








== − − + − ∆ − −
∂
   (4.15) 
The first term is positive, the second and the third terms are negative, and the sign of Kθ 
is indeterminate, depending on the degree of political instability ρ. The lower ρ (the   20
more politically stable the country), the higher is θ and then Kθ>0. When θ large, the 
temptation to devalue is low once a commitment to defend the parity is clearly 
established, because the costs resulting from devaluation expectations are large. So the 
probability of selecting a flexible system is low (Kθ>0).  
From equation (4.13), it is possible to derive a number of hypotheses regarding the 
likelihood that a country will choose a flexible exchange rate regime. A higher variance 
of external shocks, σ ² that raises traded output volatility under a pegged exchange rate 
regime will increase the likelihood that a flexible exchange rate is selected:  
 
4 ²(1 (1-q)(1 ) ² 1) 0 ² ²
K
K ϕβ θ λ σ σ
∂
== + − ∆ − <
∂
       (4.16) 
The larger is the weight on the real target, the higher is the probability of choosing a 
flexible exchange rate regime: 
 
4 ²² ( 1 ( 1 - q ) ( 1 ) ²1 ) 0
K
K βσ θ λ ϕ ϕ
∂
== + − ∆ − <
∂
       (4.17) 
Devarajan and Rodrik (1992) note that countries where economic policy is highly 
politicized, and where the central bank lacks autonomy generally, put a higher weight 
on the real target ϕ  relative to the weight on price stability. In view of the objective of 
being re-elected, the policymakers create a temporary economic expansion:  








           ( 4 . 1 8 )  
This means that political uncertainties with respect to being re-elected increase the costs 
of abandoning the commitment to a fixed exchange rate and so increase the likelihood 
of selecting a flexible exchange rate regime.  
On the other hand, a higher probability of abandoning the peg q makes the exchange 
rate regime more likely to be selected: 
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θγ π π θϕβ σ λ θ +
∂
== − −− − ∆ − − <
∂
   (4.19) 
Note that the first term is negative and the second term is positive. There are two 
offsetting effects:   
  '' '
K





        ( 4 . 2 0 )  
The first term is negative, meaning the higher is the political instability, the larger are 
the costs of abandoning the peg and the higher is the probability of adopting a flexible 
exchange rate regime. However, the second term is indeterminate. This indeterminacy 
cannot be resolved analytically. 
Finally, the sources of political instability have no direct impact on the ongoing process 
of selecting an exchange rate regime. These factors do not necessarily impinge directly   21
on the choice of an exchange rate system (Kρ  is indeterminate) but rather on the 
government’s natural time preference over the present and the future, and on the 
political costs associated with reneging on commitments to defend the parity. However, 
a country with a more unstable political system that has a higher propensity to follow 
inflationary policies will be more likely to select a flexible arrangement than to choose a 
fixed one. This is because the lack of policymaker commitment is politically costlier. 
Conclusion 
The main objective of this paper has been to define an analytical framework allowing 
the determination of an optimal exchange rate regime for a typical country of the CFA 
zone.  
An important characteristic of this approach is that the choice of an exchange rate 
regime is an integral part of a general optimization process. It calls therefore for an 
explicit specification of the objective function as a prerequisite to the analysis. The 
authorities are assumed to prefer a lower rate of inflation and a higher level of tradables 
output. The optimal exchange rate regime is the one that minimizes the expected value 
of the authorities’ loss function. 
The model of exchange rate regime choice shows that the advantage of a fixed exchange 
rate system lies in a lower inflation rate and not a higher level of production. If the 
authorities place much more weight on the real target to develop the profitability of the 
tradable sector, they will be tempted to abuse the discretionary power to alter the 
nominal exchange rate, which leads to inflationary costs. However, the model of 
exchange rate regime choice suggests that a developing economy with less inflationary 
propensity will be better off by adopting a flexible exchange rate regime in order to 
protect the profitability of the tradable sector and to reduce traded output variability. 
Furthermore, the more volatile its external shocks, the more this small open developing 
economy will be tempted to select a flexible exchange rate regime. 
This model of optimal exchange regime choice considers only the structural 
characteristics of an economy subjected to external disturbances, and confines the 
analysis to the adjustment of the nominal exchange rate. So section 4 extends the 
analysis to the case where there is an option of a pegged but adjustable exchange rate 
regime. This is to take into account the fact that fixed exchange rates are rarely 
irrevocably fixed, but can and often are adjusted. Regimes classified as ‘flexible’ 
typically involve extensive management.  
Furthermore, the political characteristics of a country are considered in the process of 
choosing an exchange rate regime. Political instability is related to weakness of 
administrative capacity and the cascading of government rules and regulations, to 
inefficient political cycles and external political pressures (from the special relationship 
between France and the CFA countries zone). These factors do not necessarily impinge 
directly on the choice of an exchange rate system (Kρ  is indeterminate) but rather on the 
government’s natural time preference over the present and the future, and on the 
political costs associated with reneging on a commitment to defend the parity. However, 
countries with a more unstable political system, ones that have a higher propensity to   22
follow inflationary policies, will be tempted to select a flexible arrangement rather than 
a fixed one. This is because the lack of policymaker commitment is politically costlier. 
Another important real world feature of developing countries which constitutes a 
limitation of the analysis is the lack of an explicit distinction between the informal and 
formal sector in the model. This is an interesting point to include in future theoretical 
research. 
Finally, there are no ready-made answers to the question of exchange rate regime 
choice, since it depends on the authorities’ macroeconomic objectives, the specificity of 
the country’s structural characteristics and political considerations. This may call for the 
CFA zone countries (small, open, export oriented economies submitted to external 
shocks and some political instability) to evolve toward a greater flexibility that 
combines the advantages of both pegged and flexible arrangements. This could be an 
exchange regime with a nominal exchange rate allowed to fluctuate within margins. The 
centre of the band should be kept as the central rate in terms of Euro to impose 
monetary policy discipline and to preserve the credibility provided by the European 
currency as long as the countries of the CFA zone maintain fairly close trade links with 
the European Union. The width of the band system would represent the economic 
activity level of the whole CFA. Its effectiveness should be linked to a more 
independent regional central bank. This will help to stabilize exchange rate movements 
within credible margins. 
This revised exchange regime with margins, by combining the advantages of both 
pegged and flexible arrangements, would impose monetary policy discipline while 
providing some flexibility for proper policy responses to external shocks. It would limit 
exchange rate volatility, stop currency over-valuation and introduce some uncertainty on 
the exchange rate path so as to limit foreign borrowing incentives. Finally, with central 
bank independence, the CFA countries evolving toward a greater flexible exchange 
arrangement should retain strong monetary and fiscal discipline.  
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